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Augustinianisms and Thomisms
ERIC GREGORY AND JOSEPH CLAIR

INTRODUCTION

The standard linage of Augustine and Aquinas that emerges in
twentieth-century textbooks of political philosophy is that of two fundamentally opposed theological approaches to the political. Augustine,
in one corner, is the clear-eyed realist, convinced that political society
is fallen, mired in the consequences of original sin and the contingent
necessity to restrain evil, vice, and sin. Aquinas, in the other corner, is
the more cheerful Aristotelian, who emphasizes the inherent goodness
and naturalness of political society and its beneficial purposes for human
flourishing.' These contrasting visions continue to animate diverse
Christian understandings of the limits and possibilities of politics.
One extraordinary feature of these two interpretive pictures is the
way that each was able to achieve rapprochement with the ideals of politicalliberalism and their institutional expression in twentieth-century
liberal democracies. By "political liberalism" we mean to refer, in a general way, to modern ideals of equality, liberty, and freedom that can take
a variety of institutional forms, but are essentially ordered by limited
government, individual rights, the consent of the governed, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. Crucially, most versions of political liberalism presume to be indifferent to the ultimate goals and purposes of
citizens, provided that they respect the laws and tasks necessary for the
operation of responsible government. Theological rapprochement with
political liberalism can also take a variety of forms - ranging from a
more rigorous attempt to narrate the achievements of liberal democracy as being indebted to specific Christian theological concepts, movements, or practices, to a less ambitious program of describing the ways
in which Christian commitments can be reconciled with the ideals and
institutions constitutive of liberal democratic life.
By the end of the century, the opposed interpretive pictures of
Augustine and Aquinas were also able to inspire an opposite, shadow
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argument for Augustinian and Thomistic antiliberalism. The story of
this reconciliation and its reversal in the last decades of the twentieth
century epitomizes the story of political Augustinianisms and
Thomisms, and in some ways tells the story of political theology in
Europe and America in the twentieth century in miniature.
The Augustinian side of this story has received renewed attention
in recent work in both political theology and discussions of religion
in public life. While it is difficult to overstate the significance of various retrievals of Aquinas for contemporary moral theology (especially
in terms of natural law, virtue, and the structure of human action)
and important forms of modernity criticism, their relation to political
theology has been largely implicit. Notwithstanding the influence of
Alasdair Macintyre and John Finnis, it is striking that few recent proposals in political theology adopt an explicitly Thomist perspective.
Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is time to reassess this narrative and hopefully begin a new chapter. Telling a new,
more accurate story will require reexamination of the standard interpretive pictures and a reconstruction of each thinker's political thought
in light of the demands of the present day. In this chapter, therefore,
we argue for a revision of the standard interpretive pictures that brings
Augustine and Aquinas closer together. Our argument creates a new
vantage from which to imagine the application of their thought to the
political challenges of the twenty-first century.
Road Map
In the first section of this chapter, we tell the story of the standard inter-

pretive pictures and their early to mid-century harmonization with
political liberalism, and conclude with the reversals these conciliations
suffer in the closing decades of the twentieth century. In the second section we argue for a revision of these textbook interpretations that moves
Augustine's and Aquinas's political thought closer together - specifically
focusing on each thinker's understanding of the naturalness of political
society and their compatible conceptions of political life and its role in
human flourishing. Naturalness is a highly contested term in Augustine
and Aquinas studies, especially given the thinkers' shared eschatological
perspective that can be obscured by strong contrastive interpretations of
the "natural" and "supernatural." Henri de Lubac's influential challenge
to certain Neo-Thomist understandings of the opposition of the natural
and supernatural remains central to contemporary theological debates,
though strangely neglected in political theology. De Lubac's Augustinian
Thomism, itself part of a longer tradition of mediation between our two
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figures, strikes us as a plausible and neglected voice for reflection on the
naturalness of politics. In a final section we take these points of congruence just established and sketch a way toward an Augustinian-Thomist
political theology, arguing that one can be both Augustinian and Tho mist
in one's political attitudes and activities.
Our argument, in short, is that Augustine has a stronger sense of
the naturalness of political life than interpreters have seen, and that it
is much more akin to Aquinas's than interpreters have suggested. The
two thinkers fundamentally and primarily view political life as tempo ral: the relationship between the goods constitutive of temporal political life and the eternal goods of ultimate human happiness form both
the primary distinction and primary bridge between church and political society. Augustine and Aquinas's shared eschatological eudaimonism provides the lens through which to examine political liberalism
and liberal democracy as a contingent political arrangement susceptible
to affirmation and critique.
THE STANDARD STORY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
INTERPRETATIONS

Thomist and Augustinian Reconciliation with
Liberal Democracy
Thomism
The task of reconciling Aquinas's political thought with liberal democracy gained new urgency after World War I. Neo -Thornist philosophers
and Christian democratic parties in Europe and Latin America began
developing and reformulating aspects of Thomist social thought in support of liberal theories of democracy and human rights. At the same
moment in the United States, Mortimer Adler and Robert Hutchins
interested a new generation of students in Neo-Thomism and Thomist
political thought at the University of Chicago- as evidenced in the list of
publications in the University of Chicago Press's Walgreen Foundation
Series. Preeminent among these Neo-Thomist thinkers was Jacques
Maritain (189I-I965), along with Yves Simon, Heinrich Rommen, Josef
Fuchs, and others.
Maritain's work in this period focuses largely on Aquinas's
understanding of the naturalness of political society.2 Like others
in this generation, he is responding to Pierre Rousselot's influential
early-twentieth-century effort to find a place for Thomism in modern
discussions of freedom and individual right.J For Aquinas, the natural
common good achieved in political community stands apart from the
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supernatural, eternal good found only in God, by grace, and is partially
glimpsed in the ecclesial community. Aquinas's strong sense of the
naturalness of political life for human flourishing then becomes central to Maritain's approach in reformulating a Thomist endorsement of
modern liberal democratic institutions.4 For it is this conception of a
n atural common good that provides a positive view of political society
and its role in human flourishing, without also assigning it an ultimate
role. That crucial limit provided protection from the excesses of a theocratic European past and the threat of a totalitarian present. To assuage
liberal anxieties about the perfectionist or communist tone of a privileged common good in the wake of World War II, Maritain increasingly
emphasizes Aquinas's thick conception of personhood and agency as he
constructs a corresponding theory of rights to protect individuals from
the excesses of state authority.

Augustinianism
There was an initial effort in the interwar period by Gustave Combes
and others to identify the consonance between Augustine and Aquinas
on the naturalness of political life and its natural common good.s Henri
de Lubac, for example, cites himself in fundamental agreement with
Combes's reading.6 But this program quickly came under fire and gave
way to a Neo-Thomist rejection of Augustine's political thought on
the grounds that it lacked a clear distinction between the natural and
supernatural common good, applicable to religious and political life.
This criticism is crystallized in the thesis of Henri-Xavier Arquilliere's
1934 work: L'augustinisme politique: Essai sur la formation des theories politiques du moyen-age. Arquilliere's argument is twofold: first,
Augustine's political thought lacks a careful distinction between the
natural and supernatural good (as that distinction can be applied to
realms of social existence). And, second, Augustine's medieval inheritors - especially Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, Gregory VII, and
Giles of Rome - all pursued the subordination and subsequent absorption of the civic order by the supernatural order of the church, citing
Augustine's political thought as their model and authority in doing so.
Thus "political Augustinianism" comes to designate, for Arquilliere, the
essence of Christendom's hierarchical organization of religious authority over temporal authority.
Although Arquilliere's understanding of political Augustinianism
is more about the historical reception of Augustine's ideas than interpretation of texts, it stands as an important chapter in our argument. For Arquilliere's thesis is thoroughly shaped by, and represents,
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Neo-Thomist views of Augustine's political thought prevalent in his
time, especially those of Pierre Mandonnet and Etienne Gilson. The
case of Gilson's Neo-Thomist criticism of Augustine's political thought
is more nuanced than Mandonnet's. Yet both ultimately agree that
Augustine is missing the appropriate distinction between natural
and supernatural realms necessary to protect the political community from being subordinated to, or absorbed by, the ecclesial community and its authority. Perhaps this kerfuffle was partially a case of
inter-Catholic theological rivalry or scapegoating in the wake of World
War I. Nevertheless, Arquilliere's line of thought signals the divergence
between political Augustinianism and Thomism in the twentieth century, a divergence that has since sedimented.
Strikingly, no immediate inheritors of the debate made a concerted
effort to revive Combes's harmonization of Augustine and Aquinas on
the natural common good after Arquilliere's critique. In the wake of
World War II, Augustinians sought an alternative route for reconciling
with liberal democracy and political liberalism - one that emphasized
the inherent limits and follies of political life as a foundation for human
flourishing. Rather than naturalness, Augustinians began emphasizing
the genuine contingency of politics in Augustine's thought.
The first major response to Arquilliere came from Henri Irenee
Marrou who, in his 1957 Warburg Lectures, "Civitas Dei, civitas terrena: num tertium quid?," claims that it is not the naturalness of political society that secures its value, or guarantees · its intelligibility, in
Augustine's theology, but rather its temporality. Between the coming
of Christ and the end of history, Marrou claims, there is the time and
space of the present age (saeculumJ wherein the two cities -earthly and
heavenly - are intermingled on their way toward their final eschatological destinations. Directly against Arquilliere's thesis, Marrou argues
that it is the "mixed nature" of the political sphere -necessarily a mixture of ultimate religious identities - that makes the political sphere
a tertium quid, namely the reality of a saeculum where the two cities
overlap.? This third thing, Marrou suggests, is the heart of Augustine's
ambivalent affirmation of the temporal common good found in political society. The "natural" does not name an autonomous category of
value, for Augustine, but rather the primary description of the temporal, created goods constitutive of political society. Thus the meaning of
these goods is subject to the vicissitudes of salvation history, apart from
which their goodness is not ultimately intelligible. Marrou's argument
is intended to correct Arquilliere's thesis as it also highlights the misinterpretations of Augustine by his medieval political inheritors.
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Writing at the same moment as Marrou- in the aftermath of World
War II and the beginning of the Cold War- Augustinians in the United
States such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Deane also highlighted
Augustine's sense of the contingency of politics, except this time with
darker hues. Not merely temporal, political life for Niebuhr's and
Deane's Augustine was a contingent intervention of God's providential
judgment after sin aimed to help restrain chaos and maintain order.
Thus the unnaturalness of politics - for Marrou and realists such as
Niebuhr and Deane - is ultimately rooted in Augustine's sense of its
historical provisionality. This provisionality, such interpreters argue,
also secures political society's immunity from the ultimate aims of
human fulfillment.
These two avenues of thought- Marrou's sense of historical temporality and the realists' sense of postlapsarian contingency - are
synthesized in what stands as the culminating point of the rapprochement between Augustine and political liberalism: Robert Markus's
Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, published in 1970.8 Markus makes an intuitive leap from the interpretive
work of Marrou and Deane, presenting Augustine's political thought as
the harbinger of secular political liberalism. Markus transitions from
the time-bound sense of political temporality espoused by Marrou to a
stronger thesis of neutrality. With Markus's Augustine, political society
becomes a religion-free zone, given its limited ambitions for practical
political arrangement without theoretical agreement on matters of comprehensive doctrine. Markus's precise understanding of neutrality and
the limited role of religious argument in the public square finds further
nuance in his later work, where he adopts a Rawlsian vision of "overlapping consensus" joined with Maritain's "democratic secular faith."9
For Markus, it is not merely the case that Augustine happens not
to have espoused a view of the naturalness of politics like that found in
Thomas Aquinas. Rather, the absence of a natural antecedent for political society brings us to the core of Augustine's political thought; for
if political society is natural it is always open to - indeed it is waiting
for- its fulfillment in the supernatural common good. But for Markus's
Augustine, the political is an antiperfectionist institutional arrangement set up merely to secure physical survival. The temporal domain
of the political remains neutral to religion and autonomous until the
very end, in anticipation of an eschatological closure that is beyond
human agency.
In Markus, we find the reversal of Arquilliere's thesis. Augustine's
political thought no longer threatens to absorb the temporal into the
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eternal (without an adequate distinction between the natural and supernatural). For Markus, there is simply too much eschatological deferral
and historical ambiguity in Augustine's conception of the two cities to
legitimate an interpretation like Arquilliere's . Markus argues that the
Neo-Thomist distinction between the natural and supernatural common good, applied to the institutions of church and political society,
threatens to make politics a halfway house for human flourishing, tending toward religious authority, constantly in need of a grace that can
perfect it.
Reversals
By the end of the twentieth century these reconciliations with political
liberalism came under fire from within both Augustinian and Thomist
camps. Critics declared that such mid-century harmonization with
political liberalism had gone too far, overstretching and reifying the central political concepts of the natural (Aquinas) and temporal (Augustine)
into a pristine, secular space, disconnected from the ultimate supernatural or eternal good. This line of criticism suggests that such rapprochements exhibit conceptual failures that promote accommodation
to the practices of secular political life - practices that are immune to
the sacred and inimical to the smaller forms of community necessary
to pursue the common good. Indeed such practices are beleaguered by
the demons of excessive individualism and technocratic capitalism that
ultimately consume liberal democracies and must be resisted. Thus the
alliance went too far, critics suggested, and dulled the critical edges of
Augustine's and Aquinas's theology- the very edges that made them
so helpful for reflecting on modern politics. Indeed, far from restraining
the excesses of the nation-state or the market, such reconciliation is
now thought to blind Christians to the ways these arrangements constitute a new (false) sacrality. The most strident critic of Markus's secular
Augustinian liberalism and its corresponding account of the saeculum
remains John Milbank. The most forceful challenge to the Neo-Thomist
reconciliation with political liberalism is Alasdair Macintyre.
Although there are immense debates in each camp about how precisely to render the natural and temporal in each thinker, it is taken for
granted that Augustine and Aquinas are fundamentally opposed on the
question of the naturalness of the political. For this reason the liberalism and antiliberalism divide in Thomism and Augustinianism has
reached an impasse. Rather than rehearse the terms of the debate or
choose sides it will be more useful to reexamine the standard interpretive pictures.
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CORRECTING THE STANDARD INTERPRETATIONS:
BRINGING AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS CLOSER
TOGETHER

Mid-century Augustinian liberals doubled down on the apparently
unnatural aspects of politics - a merely historical excursion through
the consequences of sin - rather than searching for the missing natural
antecedent to political life in Augustine's thought and thus responding
to Neo-Thomists on their own terms. Part of what made Augustine's
political thought so attractive to mid-century interpreters was his strong
sense of the tragic dimension of human existence: the fact that all are
tainted by original sin and experience some measure of fated powerlessness in the face of evil.
Yet the political often must be carefully teased out of Augustine's
theology, and the mid-century affinity for tragedy led to a fixation on
those notoriously dark passages in The City of God that seem most
like political theory and most helpful in diagnosing the horrors of
the twentieth century. Take, for example, Augustine's response to
Cicero's De republica and his claims about the impossibility of true
justice in this life (2.21; 19.21, 24); Augustine's comparison of emperors and superpirates (4-4); his claims about the similarity between
the authority exercised by kings and slave owners (19.14-15); the
vignette of a mournful judge lamenting his duty to access truth by
torture (19.6); and so on. Note that the majority of these passages
appear in Book 19 of The City of God- the locus classicus of political
Augustinianism. And there are good reasons for the authority of this
particular text. In many ways it is, as Oliver O'Donovan has called
it, "a microcosm of Augustine's social thought ."ro It also provides the
perfect length of assigned reading for Augustine's political theology
in a survey course.
The problem, however, is that the narrow concentration on this
text - and its few tenebrous images -led to a distorted perception of the
character of Augustine's political theology as a whole and its interpretive and practical possibilities. If Book 19 was the ur-text for the shadowy postwar Augustine, its fourteenth and fifteenth chapters form the
interpretive center of it all. It is important to note that these chapters more than any other- are used to validate the claim that, for Augustine,
political society is ultimately rooted in the consequences of original
sin. What is more, this text is ground zero for those intent on trumpeting the difference between Augustine's and Aquinas's political thought.
Let us briefly turn to a closer examination of Book 19 and the widely
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divergent conclusions Augustinians drew from it in the second half of
the twentieth century.
Part of the reason City of God 19.I4-I5 is seen to provide such conclusive evidence that, for Augustine, political society is rooted in the
consequences of original sin is that it provides his only account of political society as it would have existed in a state of innocence, before the
fall. The passage appears in the context of Augustine's broader reflection
on the contingent (in the negative sense of contingent denoting something unnatural and expressive of temporal or provisional evil) origins
of the institution of slavery.
[God] did not intend that a rational creature, made in his own
image, should have lordship (dominor) over any but irrational creatures: not man over man, but man over beasts. Hence, the first just
(iustus) men were established as shepherds of flocks, rather than as
kings of men (reges hominum). This was done so that in this way
also God might indicate what the order of nature requires, and what
the desert of sinners demands. By nature, then, in the condition in
which God first created man, no man is the slave either of another
man or of sin. (City of God 19.15)
Augustinian liberals and antiliberals alike read this passage as a blanket
statement about the origins of political authority, and further evidence
of Augustine's view of political society as essentially coercive, aimed
primarily to help restrain evil, vice, and sin. What is striking are the very
different conclusions drawn from it for thinking about the application of
Augustine's political thought to modern political life.
Robert Markus concludes from this passage that the authority that
would have been exercised in a state of innocence would have been akin
to the paternal authority of Old Testament patriarchs or of a Roman
paterfamilias over his wife and children, rather than the political
authority that a king exercises over his subjects. Markus argues further that, in this passage, Augustine is identifying political authority
in general with the authority of masters over slaves, thus fundamentally casting the institutions and relationships necessary for political
society into contingent darkness. The key here, for Markus, is that
the family - and therefore the corresponding institution of the household - is in some sense natural in a way that political society cannot
be, for Augustine. Whereas the family can be, hypothetically, ruled
without domination, this cannot be true of political society. Its contingent origins in human sinfulness and providential judgment exclude it
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from both naturalness and the possibilities of nondomination. Markus
claims that, for Augustine:
Coercive power is part of the essence of political authority, without
it the state is not a state . . . . Political authority, coercive power, and
its [institutional] apparatus are what transform society into a state.
Society, so we may summarize Augustine's view, has its origins in
the order of naturei the state is a dispensation rooted in sin . . . . The
terms in which Augustine came to formulate his views on politically organized society . . . were those which he thought appropriate to the treatment of the institution of slavery, rather than those
which he applied to the family.
11

For Markus, the postlapsarian contingency of political authority, and
thus political society more generally, serves to strengthen his overall
rendering of Augustine as godfather of a low-flying minimalist liberal
politics, committed to the relative autonomy, neutrality, and secularity
of the political sphere.
Strikingly, John Milbank, Markus's opponent in all things pertaining to Augustine, shares precisely Markus's view of Augustine on
politics and original sin. For Milbank, just as for Markus, City of God
19.14- 15 reveals, "that Augustine regards the institution of slavery after
the fall, and the institution of political power, as virtually one and the
same event." n Both authors read Augustine's comments about kingship
in 19.15 as evidence that he identifies political authority with the authority of masters over slaves. Both conclude that this type of authority is
contingently rooted in the consequences of original sin. They then read
backward, as it were, and lump political community and institutions
into the same category as authority. The equation is complete. Thus, for
Markus's and Milbank's Augustine, political society is entirely unnatural in comparison with the family and the institution of the household.
It is unnatural in the sense that it is not part of the order of human sociality inherent in the grain of creation.
Yet this shared conclusion leads Milbank to a very different appro priation of Augustine's political thought. For Milbank, the origins of
political society in sin supports an ambitious claim that, for Augustine,
the church, the ecclesia, is the only truly political society, and that its
arrival in history spells the undoing of pagan political thought and practice. At the climax of his argument, Milbank states very baldly that
"[a]ll political theory in the antique sense is relocated by Christianity
[beginning with Augustine], as thought about the Church."'3 And, what
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is more, "the Church itself, as the realized heavenly city, is the telos of
the salvific process. And as a civitas, the church is, for Augustine, itself
a 'political' reality."' 4 For Milbank's Augustine, the goods constitutive
of political society do not have their own natural integrity or intelligibility, nor do they have their own provisional secular (or time-bound)
integrity, as they do for Markus. The realm of politics - that is, the
"realm of the merely practical" - when "cut off from the ecclesial/'
Milbank concludes, "is quite simply a realm of sin."'s
It is Augustinian liberals and antiliberals' shared sense of the temporality of politics - as fundamentally rooted in the murky origins of
sin - that eliminates any natural antecedent for political society. We
believe this connection between politics and the contingency of sin
breeds confusion, either hardening the temporality of the political
sphere into the rigid secularity of Markus or deflating it into Milbank's
realm of the merely practical to be subordinated to the ecclesial. For
without a presupposed natural antecedent in Augustine's thought,
political society is doomed to swing between these interpretive poles
of the purely secular space or the fragile temporal realm waiting to be
swallowed by the ecclesia.
Markus and others present such a rendering of politics and sin in
City of God I9.I4-IS in direct opposition to Aquinas's understanding of
the naturalness of politics. Aquinas treats the origins of political authority twice, first in his Commentary on the Sentences (44.q.2.a.2) and then
again in Summa Theologiae (ra.96.3, 4). In both instances Aquinas is in
direct conversation with Augustine's City of God r9.I4-rs . In Thomas's
treatment of the question in Summa Theologiae, he argues that free
political rule (as opposed to slave keeping) would have been necessary
even in humankind's state of created innocence. To make this argument, Aquinas draws a simple distinction between two types of dominion: the authority of a master over a slave and the authority associated
with "the office of governing free men" (96.4). The second type has
membership in an original, prelapsarian goodness - with all its practical structures for the cause of ruling subordinated to the common good.
The first type, by contrast, expresses merely a contingent, postlapsarian
form of domination - the suppression of XX by YY. Aquinas is clear that
both the household and political society can and should be governed by
the first type of authority. In making this distinction, Aquinas thinks
he is closely following Augustine's City of God I9.r4-rs, and is distancing himself from Aristotle's view of natural slavery in the Politics. In
Summa Theologiae ra.96-4, Aquinas says:
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The control of one over another who remains free, can take place
when the former directs the latter to his own good or to the common
good. And such dominion would have been found between man and
man in the state of innocence for two reasons. First, because man is
naturally a social animal; and in consequence would have lived in
society, even in the state of innocence. Now there could be no social
life for many persons living together unless one of their number
were set in authority to care for the common good. Many individuals are, as individuals, interested in a variety of ends .... Secondly,
if there were one man more wise and righteous than the rest, it
would have been wrong if such gifts were not exercised on behalf of
the rest .... So Augustine says, "The just rule not through desire of
domination, but because it is their duty to give counsel"; and "This
is ordained by the natural order, for thus did God create man." (City
of God 19.14- 15)
Markus, in a revealing appendix to his book, argues that Aquinas's insistence on the naturalness of political authority commits him to a view
of freedom akin to what Isaiah Berlin calls "positive freedom" - that is,
the notion "that one remains free, even in being coerced, provided that
it is for his own or the common good."' 6 Augustine, however, Markus
claims, espouses an entirely negative conception of freedom in the sense
that any coercion in the political sphere implies a diminution of liberty.' 7
On Markus's reading, political authority, for Augustine, remains
entirely (and perhaps tragically) tethered to the judicial and penal operations of coercion. Aquinas is therefore merely mistaken, on Markus's
account, insofar as he sees any positive role for political authority in the
work of virtue cultivation or overall human flourishing. Aquinas's distinction of two kinds of rule is a pregnant one for understanding the possibility of noncoercive political relations bound by law. Note, however,
that Markus's insistence on Augustine's protoliberalism (of a distinctive kind) is inflected in his interpretive debate around these texts. We
believe he is mistaken. In particular, Markus's borrowed modern notion
of freedom as noninterference distorts more than it reveals with respect
to relevant differences between Augustine and Aquinas. Their accounts
of freedom, and subsequent debates about whether politics is essentially
coercive, simply do not map onto these distinctions. A more productive
reading of these texts would emphasize Augustine and Aquinas's shared
indebtedness to the republican tradition of political thinking on liberty
and domination, as can be found in the work of Peter J. Burnell.
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The full exegetical details of this interpretive debate are manifold
and would require a lengthier treatment of their discussions of mastery and servitude, and their different accounts of the nature of law,
east of Eden. Let it be sufficient to note that Aquinas saw his presentation of human sociality and the naturalness of political authority in ST
ra.96-3-4 as standing in fundamental agreement with Augustine's City
of God r9.I4-I5. Consider the similarities of their approaches to political authority in these two texts.
First, the natural, for Augustine and Aquinas, signifies the order of
creation as it existed in a state of innocence before the fall. Second, the
question of the naturalness of political society for each thinker is not a
question of the raw aggregate of individuals who form a civil community, but rather of the naturalness of the forms of rule or authority that
govern such a community. Third, implied in each author's account of
authority is a picture of the profound fabric of political authority, civil
community, and the common good unique to political community.
Both Augustine and Aquinas endorse a conception of political society as
a mesh of roles, institutions, and obligations in which the accent mark
in the formation of political community falls on the authority of political officials. Their analysis of political society centers on the virtues
necessary to fulfill the role-specific obligations associated with political
office and the direction and formation of citizens. Finally, Augustine
and Aquinas both fundamentally agree that humankind's natural sociality expresses itself in a series of concentric "moral circles" extending
outward from the individual to the family, civil society, ecclesial community, and ultimately to all human beings and God. Contra Markus,
we believe this is the most plausible way to read City of God 19. Each of
these spheres of community, in turn, is embedded in an institution (e.g.,
household, commonwealth, church) and plays a role in human flourishing. For both authors, then, the temporal common good of political society provides a genuine, albeit incomplete, form of happiness.
The clearest evidence of Augustine's understanding of the "naturalness" (in the sense of original created goodness) of political authority is
found not in City of God I9.14-15 but in his advice to public officials in
his letters. There we find an Augustinian account of political leadership.
There we get glimpses of public officials fulfilling their role-specific
obligations in a distinctively Christian way - a way that supports the
public good and also openly directs it toward the eternal good. Indeed,
the letters in Augustine's correspondence with public officials such
as Marcellinus and Macedonius are now being recognized by many
as the center, not the periphery, of Augustine's political thought (see
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especially Letters 138 to Marcellinus and Letter 155 to Macedonius). For
it is in these texts that we find Augustine at his most practical, offering
detailed descriptions of the ways Christian faith should influence the
performance of one's public responsibilities. Robert Dodaro's work on
Augustine has brought these neglected texts into the mainstream of
dialogue about Augustine's political ethics, against scholars in the more
11
realist 11 tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Deane.
Augustine's focus in these texts is the public official's soul, not
political regimes. His political language is that of virtuous rule, not
church and state. The transformation of political society by Christian
faith begins at the level of the political official's role-specific obligations - specifically as the virtues necessary to carry out these obligations in the governance of political society are reinterpreted in light of
the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.
Illustrative of this approach is Letter 155 to Macedonius, who was
imperial vicar of Africa during the years 413-414 AD, in which he
oversaw the administration of justice in all of Roman Africa. At some
point during Macedonius's tenure at this post, Augustine appealed to
him for clemency on behalf of a criminal condemned to capital punishment. Through their exchange of letters (152, 153, 155) we learn that
Macedonius grants the appeal, and Augustine writes to thank him and
congratulate him on his decision. The climax of Augustine's argument
to Macedonius in Letter 155 is that Macedonius must now learn to practice the political virtues required by his office with the twofold goal of
tending the people's temporal and eternal well-being:
The source of happiness is not one thing for a human being and
another for a city: a city is indeed nothing other than a like-minded
mass of human beings. Take all your virtues: all the prudence with
which you try to serve human affairs, all the courage with which
you allow no enemy's wickedness to frighten you, all the moderation
through which you keep yourself from corruption when surrounded
by the rottenness of contemptible human habits, all the justice which
you use to judge correctly in assigning to each his due. Suppose that
you employ all these virtues in toiling and struggling merely for the
physical security of those you want to do well. . .. Then neither your
virtues nor the happiness that comes from them will be real. . .. If
any of your governing, however informed by the virtues, is directed
only to the final aim of allowing human beings to suffer no unjust
hardships in the flesh; and if you think that it is no concern of yours
to what purpose they put the peace that you struggle to provide for
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them (that is, to speak directly, how they worship the true God, with
whom the fruit of peaceful life is found), then all that effort towards
the life of true happiness will not benefit you at all. ' 8
Letter I 55 to Macedonius turns out to be an extended discussion of
the relationship between virtue and happiness as it is practiced and
experienced in the life of a political ruler. It provides an insight into
Augustine's understanding of the good use of political authority that
goes well beyond City of God I 9 . I 4- I 5. It also reveals that political society is "natural," for Augustine, insofar as it is a constitutive element of
the social well-being that human beings were created to pursue.
The analogue to Augustine's account of virtue and happiness in these
letters to public officials is Aquinas's account of the way the infused
theological virtues of faith, hope, and love orient human beings to the
eternal common good and thereby help direct their use and experience
of temporal goods.' 9 Although we must pay attention to the relationship
and differences between Augustine's and Aquinas's understanding of the
limited natural and temporal qualities of the common good achieved
in political life (especially through law), they are in agreement in their
description of how the gifts of the theological virtues are necessary to
orient human beings toward eternal happiness. A common link between
Augustine's and Aquinas's political thought is their shared Neoplatonic
framework in thinking about how the theological virtues reorient the
practice of the cardinal virtues in temporal political life. Although
scholars have begun tracing the Neoplatonic elements in Augustine's
thinking about the theological and political virtues, more work needs
to be done on these same elements in Aquinas's thought relative to
more familiar accounts of Aristotelianism and natural law (especially
Aquinas's account of whether or not cardinal virtues remain in heaven).
On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus (De regno ) can also be read as
Aquinas's (or at least a very early Thomistic) presentation of the ways
that the infused virtues fundamentally reorient one's responsibilities
for tending the temporal, political common good. The text, admittedly
of disputed authorship, applies a Thomistic conception of the theological and political virtues in the instruction of an actual public official.

TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY AUGUSTINIAN-THOMIST
POLITICAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY

In many ways, Augustine's age is closer to our own than Aquinas's,
for the institutional relationship between church and political society,
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bishop and magistrate, was still very much in flux. For Augustine, the
relationship of political life and Christian faith is a matter of virtue,
worked out on the battlefield of the public official's soul. Although
Augustine's statesmanship approach to politics can strike the contemporary mind as elitist and underdeveloped in terms of structural analysis,
it holds principles that are transferable for a more popular, democratic
Christian virtue ethics of citizenship. This democratic translation has
been the trend in contemporary political Augustinianism since the work
of Dodaro, Gregory, and Mathewes.
Twentieth-century attempts to construct institutional renderings
of Aquinas's natural and supernatural common good, or Augustine's
temporal and eternal good, that can be neatly applied to church and
political society have run their course and climaxed in the stalemate of
a liberal and antiliberal debate over secularity. These distinctions primarily apply, for each thinker, to the virtues and corresponding goods
associated with them. Both Augustine and Aquinas think of political
theology more in terms of virtue ethics than institutional analysis.
Ultimately, political questions are questions about the transformation
of the political (cardinal) virtues by faith, hope, and love. And these
questions are, in turn, questions about what it means to refer the common good achieved in political life toward its ultimate end in God, who
is eternal happiness.
Thus the genuinely constructive work that lies before political
Thomists and Augustinians falls into three categories. First we must
identify the political virtues- especially those most relevant to contemporary democratic life - and describe what their reorientation by faith,
hope, and love might look like. Part of this description brings about
the second constructive task of identifying exemplars - both past and
present, statesmen and citizens - who embody these virtues and their
transformation through faith, hope, and love. Once such virtues and
embodied transformations can be identified, we will be in a better position to describe what the referral of the natural or temporal common
good toward eternal happiness might amount to at the level of political
practice.
Referral brings us to the grand question in Augustine's and Aquinas's
political thought: what is the relationship between earthly happiness
and the ultimate form of happiness found only with God in eternity?
That is, what is the relationship between political and eschatological
eudaimonism? And, how do we avoid the previous errors of absorption
(Christendom) and separation (secularism) in answering such a ques tion? Note that both the natural and supernatural distinction, and
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temporal and eternal one, can lead to these errors if broadly applied at
the institutional level. The way to avoid the twin errors of absorption
or separation is to focus not simply on institutions but on individuals;
not on raw individuals, but socially coded individuals in their distinctive roles, as members of all levels of society and as tenders of particular common goods who are in need of specific virtues. Such virtues
are always threatened by unjust social and political practices. Getting
a grip on these questions is more fundamental to the political thought
of Augustine and Aquinas than institutional questions of church and
political society, and yet the two sorts of question are never ultimately
disconnected. For both thinkers the church is the locus of virtue formation and of the relationships necessary for discernment, and political
society is the place where political virtue must be transformed by faith,
hope, and love.
Responding to such questions, no doubt, will be informed by the
sort of philosophical and theological reflection characteristic of contemporary political theology, often at odds with much of political theory
resistant to such questions (including the work of many self-identified
Augustinian and Thomist political thinkers). Concepts like naturalness, necessity, coercion, domination, and the common good remain
high on the agenda for any theological interpretation of politics. In fact,
we have highlighted areas where the political implications of major
developments in theological scholarship on these thinkers remain
undertheorized. But, as the best critics of our actual politics rightly have
noted, theory alone cannot support the type of social change required
to transcend the distinctive challenges of modern political communities and their economic arrangements. Here, with Macintyre, we share
many of the concerns about abstraction and philosophical exclusion
noted by critics of liberalism and its characteristic bureaucratic and procedural expressions. Further theorizing of theory's relation to practice,
or even Augustine's relation to Aquinas on supernatural grace, also will
not meet these challenges. Prophetic critique, moreover, risks its own
moral and political hazards.
Despite many valid theological criticisms of their work, Augustinians
and Thomists in the mid-twentieth century like Reinhold Niebuhr and
John Courtney Murray sought to provide a genuinely political Christian
political theory, attentive to the details of political structures and processes without sacrificing normative reflection on the demands of politicalleadership and citizenship. 20 Contemporary Augustinian-Thomists
can, and should, still learn from these forebears and be grateful for their
concerns about the political institutions of a free society. Their concerns,
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attentive to political theory and political science, stand in stark contrast with the ecclesial focus of more recent work in political theology.
Our rejection of the "institutional level" opposition of Augustine and
Aquinas serves a different purpose. It may be that the debate over politicalliberalism has truncated our receptions of their political theologies.
In fact, in addition to emphasis on the distinctive liturgical practices for
training Christian virtue, further work in political theology might best
be served by attending in more focused ways to how Augustinian and
Thomist perspectives can inform debates about issues like mass incarceration, immigration, and international law.
Caricatures have their pedagogical value, even in the formation of
holiness. We do not deny differences between Augustine's more consistent Platonism, and Aquinas's debts to Aristotle. Their rhetorical style
and their visions of politics took shape in radically different historical contexts. But the demands of contemporary politics require something more than sweaty Augustinian "pessimism" and serene Thomist
"optimism," let alone Augustinian "grace" and Thomist "nature."
Our effort to historicize and interrupt conventional pictures by bringing Augustine and Aquinas closer together is one attempt to open new
ways of addressing such challenges without default recourse to familiar
tropes. Dislodging their opposition, without collapsing their different
construals of human agency confronted by proximate and final ends,
might liberate and generate new imaginations for both political engagement and practical reasoning. Such a politics remains a human enterprise, adequate to our creatureliness in time, but no less divine.
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